Latin America and the Caribbean are no exception to the all but universal global applause for the election of Barack Obama as the forty-fourth president of the United States. The 33 developing countries of the Western Hemisphere broadly welcomed Obama's election to the White House. Indeed, there is no part of the world outside of Africa where the election of a black U.S. president has greater symbolic value. Latin America, which has its own dark history of slavery and racism, is home to a large African diaspora, and as much as one-third of the region's 550 million inhabitants is of African descent, including a large fraction of the population in Brazil, the vast majority of the Caribbean, and smaller communities throughout the Andes and Central America. Coupled with the fact that Latin American countries generally prefer Democratic presidents (for reasons that have as much to do with unpleasant Cold War memories of Nixon and Reagan as any specific policy agenda), Obama's emergence was a welcome event.
In a BBC poll of Latin American countries, which included opinion surveys in Brazil, Mexico, and Panama, the respondents heavily favored Obama over his opponent, Senator John McCain, and about half thought that their nation's relations with the United States would improve as a result of his election. About 60 percent of Mexicans added that it would fundamentally change their view of the United States, and slightly less than half of all Panamanians and about one-third of Brazilians agreed. While Obama's election was hailed by virtually all the presidents of Latin America and the Caribbean, the specific responses reflected the idiosyncrasies of each countryperhaps nowhere more than Brazil, where six candidates in municipal elections legally changed their names to either Barack or Obama in an attempt to capitalize on the local popularity of the American candidate. Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist who had burnished his credentials as a pragmatist by cozying up to the Bush administration, placed Obama's candidacy in a regional context, saying, "In the same way that Brazil elected a metalworker [referring to himself], Bolivia an Indian, Venezuela a Chávez, and Paraguay a bishop, I believe it will be an extraordinary thing if in the biggest economy in the world a black is elected president." Brazilian foreign minister Celso Amorim agreed, saying "We aren't going to deny that the Brazilian government had a good, pragmatic relationship with the Bush government, but now the relationship can be refined, and we hope to establish a relationship of partners with the new U.S. government." Lula later proposed two specific policy changes that he would like to see Obama implement: the end of U.S. agricultural subsidies and the repeal of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. In addition, Mexican president Felipe Calderón spoke with Obama about the challenge of fighting organized crime and drug trafficking, an issue also emphasized by Colombian president Álvaro Uribe along with the desire to pass the controversial Colombia Free Trade Agreement currently awaiting a vote in the U.S. Congress.
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez said of Obama, "We don't ask him to be a revolutionary, nor a socialist, but that he rise to the moment in the world," adding, "we hope the next government will end that savage embargo and aggression against Cuba."
Fidel Castro, the ailing 82-year old ex-president of Cuba, expressed relief that the United States had not elected McCain, whom he described as "old, bellicose, uncultured, not very intelligent, and not in good health"-proving yet again that the aging Cuban leader does not subscribe to the notion that those in glass houses should not throw stones. Castro praised Obama as "more intelligent, educated and levelheaded," but fretted that "concerns over the world's pressing problems really do not occupy an important place in Obama's mind." Another editorialist with the Cuban state-owned newspaper Granma described Obama's victory as "surprising and meteoric," which the author credited in part to McCain's fateful decision to select as his running mate "the Arctic Amazon of Alaska, Sarah Palin."
But it was Prime Minister W. Baldwin Spencer of the tiny twin island nation of Antigua and Barbuda who made the grandest gesture. He promptly wrote a letter of congratulation to the U.S. president-elect, declaring that his country's tallest mountain, the 1,319-foot Boggy Peak, would be henceforth known as Mount Obama. States "has no more important relationship in the world than the one we have with Mexico." The September 11 terrorist attacks occurred the following week, and Mexico, along with the rest of Latin America, virtually disappeared from the U.S. foreign policy agenda for the rest of Bush's first term. Still, it could be argued that, no matter where an American president's foreign policy eventually ends up, an early emphasis is often placed on Latin America.
Latin America in Focus
The initial enthusiasm for Obama in Latin America is even more striking given that his exposure to the region was minimal, and certainly far less than that of his opponent, John McCain, who was born on a U.S. military base in Panama, traveled the region widely during his quarter century in the Senate, and even made stops in Colombia and Mexico in the midst of his presidential campaign. Nor did Latin America loom large in the presidential contest, except as fodder for larger questions facing the United States in terms of immigration, trade, energy policy, and the nature of American diplomacy. The simmering domestic resentments provoked by the flow of illegal immigration to the United States, which generated more heat than light during the political warmup season of 2007, faded from view during the general election, in part because Obama and McCain had similar positions regarding the need for comprehensive immigration reform, including tougher border controls, a guest worker system, and a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants.
Obama's call to "renegotiate NAFTA" was never taken very seriously, although the free trade agreement from Colombia generated sparks between the two candidates when McCain's fierce support for the agreement contrasted with Obama's strong (if perfunctory) opposition. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, a figure who virtually all analysts agree poses the major challenge to the next administration's agenda in Latin America, was singled out as an illustration of the type of oil-exporting rogue government that the United States has become too dependent upon in fulfilling our energy needs. And both Venezuela and Cuba emerged as frequently mentioned adversarial governments that Obama advocated engaging directly, something that McCain forcefully rejected.
Still, while Latin American issues failed to play a central role in the U.S. presidential contest, they did intermittently qualify as important supporting themes. When McCain and Obama met in their first presidential debate on September 26, 2007, it was billed as a match-up on the crucial foreign policy questions confronting the United States. In reality, however, the Bosom buddies: Chávez invites Russia's president into the hemisphere.
©AP/ RIA Novosti, Dmitry Astakhov, Presidential Press Service near-implosion of the U.S. financial markets earlier in the week pushed foreign policy onto the back burner entirely for the first third of the debate. The phrase "Latin America" was used only once, by Obama, in reference to China's growing influence there. Brazil and Mexico, the two regional heavyweights (with respective populations of 190 million and 110 million), were never mentioned at all. Venezuela was briefly invoked by both candidates, with Obama warning that the United States needed to wean itself off foreign oil provided by "rogue states" like Venezuela and Iran, while McCain mentioned Hugo Chávez as part of a list of foreign adversaries with whom he claimed Obama had pledged to meet without "preconditions." McCain also named Raúl Castro, who had been recently appointed president of Cuba, as part of this same list.
The third presidential debate included a sharp exchange between McCain and Obama on the future of the Colombia free trade agreement, the small but controversial trade pact that has been a top priority for the Bush administration but a political hot potato for Democrats in Congress, who have thus far been loath to approve it. This resistance emerges from different quartersincluding free trade skeptics, powerful union opposition, those who seek payback from past free trade accords that the Bush administration shoved through Congress, and critics of Colombian president Álvaro Uribe's human rights record-but it is symptomatic of the wider breakdown in the bipartisan political consensus on trade.
During the debate, Obama outlined why he was opposed to a Colombia free trade pact, observing, "The history in Colombia right now is that labor leaders have been targeted for assassination on a fairly consistent basis and there have not been prosecutions. And what I have said [is that...we] stand for human rights and we have to make sure that violence isn't being perpetrated against workers who are just trying to organize for their rights, which is why, for example, I supported the Peruvian Free Trade Agreement which was a wellstructured agreement. But I think that the important point is we've got to have a president who understands the benefits of free trade but also is...going to stand up to other countries."
Cuba policy provided another point of contention in the U.S. presidential election campaign. It soon became clear that stark differences remained between the Cold War outlook promoted by McCain and the more flexible approach suggested by Obama who called for dramatically expanding the ability of Cuban-Americans to travel and send remittances to Cuba, while pledging to engage in dialogue with the Castro government. While some analysts have dismissed these proposals as trivial, they would nevertheless denote the sharpest break with the American policy of isolating Cuba since the end of the Cold War.
Obama struck a different tone when he elaborated on his views before a meeting organized by the Cuban American National Foundation, which is still widely viewed as the bastion of Cuban exile politics. Obama told the group, "I know what the easy thing is to do for an American politician. Every four years, they come down to Miami, they talk tough, they go back to Washington, and nothing changes in Cuba." He then recommitted himself to the premise that the goal of U.S. policy is to democratize Cuba. "My policy toward Cuba will be guided by one word: libertad. And the road to freedom for all Cubans must begin with justice for Cuba's political prisoners, the rights of free speech, a free press, and freedom of assembly, and it must lead to elections that are free and fair." Obama followed this standard political fare with a call for direct talks with Cuba. "After eight years of the disastrous policies of George Bush, it is time to pursue direct diplomacy, with friend and foe alike, without preconditions. There will be careful preparation. We will set a clear agenda. And as president, I would be willing to lead that diplomacy at a time and place of my choosing, but only when we have an opportunity to advance the interests of the United States, and to advance the cause of freedom for the Cuban people."
Obama's call for diplomacy, together with his stated interest in removing barriers to CubanAmerican travel and exchange, suggests a likely departure from the policies of isolation advocated by the Bush administration. Still, Obama's vow to "maintain the embargo" also suggests that he would resist making the broad changes to Cuba policy, including dismantling the antiquated and onerous trade sanctions, which would win wide support in Latin America.
Back to Reality
On January 20, the Obama administration is going to need to swing into action very quickly to confront a range of pressing challenges. There is little doubt about what will be at the top of the list: the financial crisis, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the quest to secure America's energy independence. Issues facing Latin America and the Caribbean, though important, are going to be of less immediate concern. By all appearances, however, Obama is likely to engage in serious and substantive work to help repair the damage that the Bush administration has wrought on U.S.-Latin American relations. Moreover, there will be a window of opportunity to push through key changes and begin to lay the foundation for the new administration's vision for renewing U.S. leadership in the Americas. If Obama quickly fulfills his pledge to shut down the detention facilities for suspected terrorists at the Guantánamo Bay naval base, then this will build goodwill in Latin America, even if the base itself remains under U.S. control. Indeed, the good news is that Obama's victory will usher in a welcome honeymoon period in a region that is strategically important for U.S. interests-and the challenge will be to prolong this moment and harness it to rebuild some semblance of hemispheric cooperation.
The challenges that President Obama will face after moving into the White House on January 20 fit into three broad categories: dealing with the unfinished business left behind by the Bush administration as well as upcoming responsibilities imposed by the international calendar; preparing to implement the policies and programs that his administration has laid out for the Americas; and managing the ongoing political, economic, and structural tensions that have become part of the inter-American landscape and will not be subject to quick solutions.
Obama began swiftly to fill important Cabinet positions with substantive responsibility for issues dealing with Latin America. The selection of Senator Hillary Clinton as secretary of state and New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson as secretary of commerce bodes well for hemispheric relations, as both have substantial experience with Latin America and are well respected in the region. More tantalizingly, Barack Obama Obama is likely to engage in serious work to help repair the damage that the Bush administration has wrought on U.S.-Latin American relations.
" " pledged during his campaign to reinstate the position of special envoy for the Americas, which has been left unfilled by President Bush. The quality, caliber, and seniority of the person selected to fill this role, which would presumably serve as a focal point for policy making in the White House, will provide an early indicator of how the Obama administration plans to engage the region.
Despite the goodwill from the hemisphere, an Obama administration will face no shortage of early challenges. In the area of U.S.-Mexico cooperation, it will be important to finalize the Merida Initiative (a $500 million military aid package to help fight organized crime) and work to shore up border security, in order to help Mexico gain the upper hand in its struggle against the threats to its governability, which include drug trafficking and the slumping economy. A related issue is whether and how Obama should think about immigration reform in tandem with the U.S.-Mexico relationship, rather than purely as a domestic problem amenable to solutions that the United States engineers alone. An early effort to enhance the U.S.-Brazil agenda will also be critical, because successfully managing this relationship will be the linchpin of United States relations with South America, and strong ties between Washington and Brasilia will also be an essential tool in helping the new administration handle a series of festering tensions in countries including Colombia, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Moreover, Brazil plans to hold its Latin American and Caribbean summit in December, which threatens to undercut the relevance of the Summit of the Americas in early 2009.
One of the Bush administration's parting gifts will be the contentious and unpopular free trade agreement with Colombia, as well as the slightest less contentious accord with Panama. (The South Korea agreement is part of this equation as well.) These agreements are unlikely to be ratified during the final days of his administration; thus Obama will either need to push them through Congress, put them out of their misery, or enter into some sort of broader good-faith effort at establishing new benchmarks for renegotiation.
Regarding Colombia, the Obama administration will need to fashion a strategy either for working to approve the free trade agreement or minimizing the political fallout that will result from abandoning it.
Steps will need to be taken to maintain security gains, respond to Álvaro Uribe's possible pursuit of a third term as president, and safeguard the bilateral relationship in the event of an absence of a trade pact. As to Venezuela, by all appearances, the Bush administration's approach of ignoring or playing down the menace posed by Hugo Chávez has run out of steam-underscored by last fall's ejection of the American ambassadors to Venezuela and its close ally, Bolivia. The ambassador to La Paz was declared persona non grata for allegedly conspiring with the opposition, and Venezuela followed suit in an act of "solidarity" with Bolivia. The incident vividly illustrated how combustible U.S. relations with these countries had become by the end of Bush's term in office. Furthermore, Chávez's relationships with Iran, Russia, and other unfriendly powers seems likely to continue deepening, and his influence in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua is clearly significant, although the decline in oil prices points to new vulnerabilities. Yet it is likely that Chávez will continue to be president of Venezuela for some time to come. His current term in office expires in January 2013, but many analysts doubt that Chávez will relinquish power so easily. Thus Obama has little to gain by engaging in counterproductive saber-rattling towards Caracas during his early months in office. Something needs to be done to set the U.S.-Venezuela relationship on a sounder footing. Fashioning a viable policy towards Venezuela, designed both to check Chávez's worrying tendencies as well as restore normal diplomatic relations, will require early attention and ultimately be a key litmus test for the success or failure of Obama's policies in Latin America.
There are two potential flashpoints in the Caribbean that also pose a series of worrying challenges. In the case of Cuba, Obama will need to follow through on his plan to implement the new travel rules for Cuban-Americans and prepare for any contingencies that emerge as an outgrowth of this policy. Haiti, for its part, is on the verge of unraveling, and the destruction from last fall's hurricane season has only deepened an ongoing humanitarian disaster that needs to be part of the regional agenda. From the U.S. standpoint, a plan of action that includes debt relief, the possible granting of Temporary Protected Status to Haitian migrants, and increased development assistance would be greatly welcomed in Port-au-Prince.
The Fifth Summit of the Americas, due to occur in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, in April 2009, will provide President Obama with an important opportunity to begin fleshing out specific proposals made during his campaign. Two initiatives that immediately come to mind are the "Energy Partnership for the Americas" to forge a path toward sustainable growth and clean energy, as well as the pledge to increase aid to the Americas through targeted micro-financing, vocational training, and small enterprise development-all of which will help reach the United Nations-backed Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Some early thinking will be required to assess the best way to advance these initiatives and what they might look like in practice.
While it is too early to know if the presidency of Barack Obama will lead to an important restructuring of inter-American relations, there is little question that the potential for momentous change is in the air. If the Obama presidency follows the pattern of its predecessors, the early warm glow of good feelings will soon give way to a pragmatic understanding on both sides of the relationship regarding the possibilities and limits of what the United States and Latin America can expect of each other.
Indeed, even in the most profusely proObama countries, there are early signs that reality is setting in. In Brazil, none of the six municipal candidates who renamed themselves after the U.S. president-elect won their seats, and in Antigua and Barbuda, the prime minister's proposal to rechristen the country's highest peak as Mount Obama sparked a fierce feud with the opposition that left local cartographers in limbo. But throughout the Americas, the hope remains that Barack Obama will be attentive and respectful to the region's concerns. If the forty-fourth president of the United States keeps an open mind and demonstrates a willingness to listen, then this alone may be enough to rekindle some of the magic that so much of the hemisphere felt upon his election to the White House.
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